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Social Imaginaries and the Theory of the Normative Utterance1 
 
   Meili Steele 
 
 
Theorists of the social imaginary, such as Benedict Anderson, Charles Taylor, Cornelius 
Castoriadis, and Marcel Gauchet have given us new ways to talk about the structures of the 
shared meanings and practices of the West. As a group, they have directed their arguments 
against the narrow horizons of meaning deployed by deliberative political theories in developing 
their basic normative concepts and principles. Anderson speaks of the new shapes of time and 
space provided by the novel and newspaper; Taylor and Gauchet discuss the ontological 
importance of the emergence of secularity, the public sphere, popular sovereignty, and the 
market; Castoriadis places creative collective imagination at the center of his work. They have 
provided an alternative to the oscillation between the constructivism of John Rawls, Jürgen 
Habermas, and Christine Korsgaard and the realism of Raymond Guess, Raymond Williams, and 
others.2 Theorists of the imaginary have enabled us to think about normatively charged collective 
imaginaries as logically prior to the construction of normative principles.3 
What theorists of the imaginary have not done is make specific connections between the 
ontological background of social imaginaries and the normative utterance. This lacuna has left 
them vulnerable to the charges of “normative deficit” and vagueness that Habermas and others 
famously make against philosophies of “world disclosure.”4 To be sure, philosophers of the 
imaginary are careful to supplement third-person accounts of political culture with 
phenomenological descriptions; however, when theorists of the imaginary move from the 
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common background provided by imaginaries to the first- and second person, the focus is usually 
on the imagination as a faculty rather than on the new conception of the normative utterance and 
political dialogue that follows from an understanding of the social imaginary.5 I will consider the 
relationship of social imaginaries to individual utterances so that we do not have the individual 
imagination set against the social context, but the utterance as reproducing and/or intervening in 
the imaginary structures. In this view, normativity is not expressed in the propositional form of 
the Rawlsian or Habermasian justification, but through a complex engagement with the 
worldhood that informs normative judgments. Looking at the normative utterance through the 
lens of social imaginaries enables us to engage the background structures that subtend discrete 
utterances, and this engagement requires richer forms of argument than what we find in 
constructivist or realist conceptions of normativity. 
I will proceed in three steps. I begin by contrasting the constructivist approach with 
Charles Taylor’s philosophy of social imaginaries and world disclosure since his work makes an 
explicit link between ontology and utterance. I then bring out the shortcomings of Taylor’s 
approach by examining briefly his debate with Robert Brandom over world-disclosure and the 
exchange of reasons. This analysis gives rise to my own account of the normative utterance, 
which I develop by looking at two examples. The first is a short story—Susan Glaspell’s “A Jury 
of Her Peers”—that dramatizes the discovery of fissures in what was taken to be a shared 
background and that articulates the normative relevance of these fissures by arguing through and 
with the social imaginary rather than normative propositions.  I then show how this kind of 
reading exposes the inadequacies in Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy of narrative, which Taylor—and 
many other philosophers—endorse and which occludes the normative claims of narrative 
utterances. The second example looks at two very different ways of engaging the American 
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imaginary surrounding race: Barack Obama’s “A More Perfect Union,” and Ta-Nahisi Coates’s 
normative challenge to Obama’s discursive form, Between the World and Me. Obama’s speech 
reanimates a canonical normative discursive framework for understanding race, Brown v Board 
of Education, which continues to exercise its power over public debate. Coates attacks this 
framework not by analyzing a principle of justice but by displaying the unacknowledged 
conflicts in the imaginary, conflicts that go unrecognized by whites and that blacks struggle to 
articulate. He writes in the form of a letter to his son, in which he deploys various kinds of 
discourse--phenomenological description, narrative, and sociological generalization--to give a 
portrait of racial division in contemporary American life. In addressing the imaginary, Coates 
reveals the failure of our current language of facts and norms.  
Thrownness and Social Imaginaries 
 In the hermeneutic perspective initiated by Heidegger, we are thrown into the world, into 
social imaginaries so that morality builds on norms that are already in place, on norms which are 
not constructed. In other words, normativity emerges through the social imaginary in a way that 
is logically prior to the conceptual formulations of ethical and political philosophy.6 What Taylor 
and the other philosophers of the imaginary cited above have done is take this transcendental 
hermeneutic point made by Heidegger and Gadamer about worldhood and refined the 
historiography with the help of work by historians and sociologists in order to examine the 
emergence and modification of particular collective historical shapes. Taylor says,  
“The social imaginary is not a set of ideas;” rather, the imaginary forms the background that 
makes sense of “the practices of a society […Thus,] the notion of a moral order goes beyond 
some proposed schedule of norms that ought to govern our mutual relations and/or political life 
[…] The image of order carries not only a definition of what is right, but of the context in which 
it makes sense to strive for and hope to realize the right.” 7 The social imaginary concerns the 
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ways that “ordinary people ‘imagine’ their social surroundings and this is often not expressed in 
theoretical terms but in images, stories, legends, etc…. The social imaginary is that common 
understanding which makes possible common practices and widely shared sense of legitimacy.”8 
These imaginaries form the background out of which we think and act but “which we do not 
entirely understand. To ascribe total personal responsibility to us for these is to want to leap out 
of the human condition.” 9 
Such a conception of normativity demands a very different form of questioning than the 
constructivist approach. In understanding and defending normative claims, we must locate 
ourselves in the space of historical imaginaries and argue through these imaginaries rather than 
finding principles to which all should agree. Hence, “the task of reason is to articulate this 
background, what we presuppose when we make a judgment that a certain form of life is truly 
worthwhile, or place our dignity in a certain achievement.”10 These are the conditions of 
intentionality.11 
We can see the relationship of the ontological background (the political) to politics in 
Taylor’s work by looking quickly at A Secular Age. At the beginning of A Secular Age, he 
distinguishes three kinds of secularism. The concerns of philosophers of public reason are placed 
in “Secularity 1,” which focuses on the retreat of religion from the common institutions and 
practices “most obviously, but not only, the state.”12 This is the normative, political secularism of 
public reason that addresses controversies such as the wearing of headscarves to school or the 
display of religious symbols on state grounds. A second sense of secularity refers to the decline 
of religious belief and practice—people no longer going to church, synagogue or mosque, for 
instance. This sociological approach is often called “secularization.” The third and most 
important sense of secularity for Taylor concerns the shift in “the conditions of belief” since this 
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sense gives a place to the ontological history he finds important. In this view, the “shift to 
secularity consists of a move from a society where belief in God is unchallenged and 
unproblematic to one in which it is understood to be one option among others, and frequently not 
the easiest to embrace.” 13 In other words, Taylor wants to examine the shift “which takes us 
from a society in which it was virtually impossible not to believe in God, to one in which faith, 
even for the staunchest believers, is one possibility among others.” 14 Taylor’s claim for 
Secularity 3 is not simply that this is a better description of contemporary society’s 
understanding of religion and secularity. His claim is philosophical. Although we may have 
much to learn from researchers in Secularity 1 and 2, they have left out the worldhood of the 
world. Sociologists may focus on gathering statistics about church or synagogue attendance as 
evidence of secularization, while political philosophers may assert the uncontroversial “fact of 
pluralism” in order to focus on the construction of norms of mutual accommodation. 15 But 
before these facts or norms can appear, they require a background that lets them show up for us 
as phenomena. Of course, people can bring different ideas and attitudes to a secularity, “but what 
they do not bring into the negotiations is the set of ideas and norms constitutive of [secularity 
itself]. This must be the common property of society before there can be any question of [debate]. 
Hence, they are not subjective meanings, the property of one or some individual, but rather 
intersubjective meanings, which are constitutive of the social matrix in which individuals find 
themselves and act.”16 Hence, Taylor’s question is: what are the background assumptions, 
practices, languages, etc. that make the contemporary experience of the secular and the religious 
possible, for believers, agnostics, and atheists? We stand in a normed world of social imaginaries 
that cannot be set aside to get clear about particular normative concepts.  
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Taylor does a genealogy of Western secularity that gives a new account of how our 
current background assumptions emerged, drawing out new historical richness and complexity 
that becomes available and normatively relevant through this problematic. We cannot just toss in 
a vague, schematic historical tale about how secularity emerged from the wars of religion and 
modern science in order to focus on the principles of public reason.17 Rather, “our sense of where 
we are is crucially defined in part by a story of how we got there. . . . And just because we 
describe where we are in relating a journey, we can misdescribe it grievously by misidentifying 
the itinerary. That is what the subtraction accounts of modernity have in fact done. To get 
straight where we are, we have to go back and tell the story properly.”18 To get oriented to the 
world and our place in it requires more than abstract principles—such as “the separation of 
church and state”—for they block out the massive background that shapes reasoning. 
Normativity cannot swing free from contestable historical accounts of how our self-
understandings came about because it is woven from specific social imaginaries. Hence, Taylor 
wants to begin reasoning by reopening the assumptions of modernity and displaying the 
complex, conflicted historical inheritance that lies behind current usage.  
The articulation of background social imaginaries brings in the third-person point of view 
that is excluded by the constructivist view, and it joins up with Taylor’s long-standing objection 
to such theories of practical reason because they “cannot articulate the background understanding 
surrounding any conviction that we ought not act in this or that way.” 19 However, we need to 
distinguish two kinds of articulations or “world disclosures” that Taylor sometimes conflates. 20 
On the one hand, there is articulation “of an already interpreted, symbolically structured world; 
the world, that is, within which we always already find ourselves,”21 and, on the other hand, 
there is the utterance, the “reflective disclosure.” The articulation of background is concerned 
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with our passive relationship to structures of intelligibility, such as we find in Taylor’s 
discussion of the public sphere, popular sovereignty in Modern Social Imaginaries, or Secularity 
3 in A Secular Age. Here the language of articulation is a socio-historical language of social 
imaginaries. These structures can be characterized in various ways, and Taylor slides—much as 
the narrator of a third-person novel does—between sociological explanations, what he calls 
“neo-Durkheimian moments,” and articulations that are close to phenomenological description of 
individual and collective experience displayed through everyday speech.  
 The utterance or “reflective disclosure”—and here I modify Kompridis’s definition—is 
the intervention in the prereflective practices and structures of meaning by an utterance, work of 
art, a film, historical or philosophical text, etc. The individual makes claims through and against 
the social imaginaries in which she finds herself. Reflective disclosure reworks the languages 
and structures used to make sense of ourselves and the world, and these interventions can take 
the form of normative arguments, as we will see. The transcendental argument against 
constructivist arguments does not just show the relevance of background structures to our self-
understanding; it authorizes new forms of argument. We are now ready for Taylor’s debate with 
Brandom over just this issue. 
Problems with Intervention as World Disclosure 
In a recent debate on language and rationality, Taylor and Brandom agree on many of the 
holistic assumptions of hermeneutics—what Brandom calls “Gadamerian platitudes”—but differ 
on the relationship of world disclosure to conceptual understanding and the exchange of 
reasons.22 Brandom insists that we “draw a bright line between conceptual understanding and 
other kinds of symbolic disclosedness.” 23 In this view, “broadly symbolic [dimensions of 
language] in Cassirer’s sense, are not conceptual in the narrow propositional sense that I render 
in terms of inference and reasons.”24 He clarifies this by drawing on Wittgenstein’s well-known 
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analogy of language as a city, “Language for [Wittgenstein] is all suburbs, merging 
imperceptibly into the surround and supporting countryside of linguistic practices, and having no 
downtown. But I think language does have a downtown, and that is the practice of giving and 
asking for reasons.”25 The practice of giving and asking for reasons swings free not only of 
symbolic uses but of particular forms of life. 
Taylor, on the other hand, does not think we can isolate reason from giving disclosure in 
this way, “I remain convinced that the articulative [disclosive] cannot be peeled off from the 
public giving of and asking for reasons.” 26Any exchange over “the factual state of things” can 
only make sense if we set them “in the context of our ability to operate through the whole range 
of symbolic forms.”27 Hence, “there are certain matters which can’t be properly explored without 
recourse to the disclosive dimension. There couldn’t be an intelligent discussion of the beauty of 
landscape which didn’t either deploy or draw on our familiarity with, say, certain paintings. 
There couldn’t be a discussion of Christian piety which didn’t draw on, say, the music of Bach, 
or certain hymns, or Chartres cathedral or an evocative life of Saint Francis.” For Taylor, there is 
a continuum between pure assertion—e.g., “soup’s on!”—where something is asserted but 
nothing is disclosed, and pure disclosure—e.g., Chopin’s Fantaisie-Impromptu in C Sharp 
Minor, which “articulates a certain as yet indefinable longing….A human possibility is 
articulated and disclosed here, but nothing is asserted.”28 Taylor gives artistic disclosure a 
privileged access to the distinctiveness of a form of life at the same time that he makes this 
disclosure ineffable. But this perspicacity does not have to define itself against conceptual 
understanding or the language of ordinary prose, as we will see.  
Although Brandom and Taylor share a holistic critique of the Kantian understanding of 
the concept—according to which the institution of conceptual norms is separate from their 
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application—they develop different kinds of holism.29 For Brandom, the key is Hegelian 
reconstruction, “[T]he rationality of the current decision, its justifiability as a correct application 
of a concept, is secured by rationally reconstructing the tradition of its applications according to 
a certain model—by offering a selective, cumulative, expressively progressive genealogy of it. 
At each stage in its development, it is insofar as one takes the tradition to be rational, by a 
Whiggish rewriting of its history, that one makes the tradition be and have been rational…This is 
reason’s march through history. In this way, as Hegel puts it, contingency is given necessity.”30 
In his book on Hegel, Taylor states his opposition to this reconstructive logic of transparent 
concepts, insisting that “the clarity of our most explicit conceptual formulations reposes on a 
background of which we are not fully aware.”31 Brandom concludes that Taylor is not a 
rationalist. 32 While I agree with Taylor on the Hegelian question, his alternative does not 
provide a satisfying account of normativity. 
Taylor focuses his attention on the Heideggerian point—that logical forms of language 
depend upon a background—rather than connecting background and normativity into an 
adequate conception of language and argument. In theorizing the individual utterance, Taylor 
makes a move that is all too typical of both defenders and critics of world disclosure by defining 
disclosure against everyday speech and normativity. In lumping together various aesthetic works 
and ignoring the disclosive power of everyday language, he fails to address the normative claims 
of “disclosive” writing that could answer disclosure’s critics. It is one thing to respect the 
insights provided by literary language: “We delude ourselves if we think a philosophical or 
critical language is somehow more hard-edged and more free from personal index than that of 
poets or novelists;”33 however, it is another to give literature blanket insight beyond challenge, 
ignoring the ways that literature can often be misleading, repulsive, or just stupid. By giving 
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literature this vatic status, he gives weight to Christina Lafont’s charge (cited in note 2 above) 
that “world disclosure seems unrevisable from within and inaccessible from without,” a charge to 
which I will respond directly.34  
Taylor follows the German hermeneutic tradition here, in placing art, particularly poetry, 
against prose and everyday speech. Wolf Lepenies notes that “the antithesis of literature and 
poetry has been maintained in all its severity only in Germany, where it has been exacerbated 
through an asociality of poetical production in principle, that even sees its chief task as being the 
‘refutation of the social.’”35 Gadamer, for instance, for all his emphasis on dialogue, still gives 
art privileged disclosive access to our being in the world in a way that exempts art from 
normative claims: “Prior to all conceptual scientific knowledge, the way in which we look upon 
the world, and upon our whole being-in-the-world, takes shape in art.”36 Gadamer opposes 
poetry and philosophy to everyday language: “Poetry and philosophy are both set off from the 
exchange of language as it takes place in practical activity and in science.” 37 
The opposition of poetry and prose has meant hostility to the distinctive genre of 
modernity, the novel. The novel is attentive to the dynamic interplay of the multiple languages of 
public life, languages ignored by Heidegger and Gadamer. Taylor views the novel mostly 
through a sociological lens, in which the novel helps shape the modern sense of space and time 
and helps establish the dignity of everyday life (Sources of the Self, Part III). The language of 
literature is a poetic language for Taylor, a language tied to the search for spiritual significance, 
not to its relevance to public, normative debates. Much of his discussion of disclosure has a 
religious character to it, and we can see this in his emphasis on the connection between 




In his new book, The Language Animal, the closest he comes to connecting imaginaries 
and normativity is when he discusses “accessive” and “existential” disclosure. Accessive 
disclosures “open a new range of phenomena to us, for instance terms to classify animals or 
trees.” 38 Existential disclosure offers “a new way of describing, or a new model for 
understanding, our human condition and the alternatives it opens for us…..We may come to this 
existential insight through meeting, or hearing about, some paradigmatic figure (the Buddha, St. 
Francis), or by reading a book about ethics or the meaning of life or (more often) by seeing a 
film.”39 Existential disclosures are made available through the language of “portrayal” rather than 
the language of assertion—e.g., Dostoevsky’s Devils (78). A “portrayal can be an alternative 
way of offering models to understand human life, alternative, that is to description.”40 He calls 
this mode “regestalting,” but this way of talking takes away any argumentative or normative 
claim. In my view, such “regestalting” can be understood as normative revision that can play on 
the same field with principled argument.  
Taylor similarly characterizes narratives by opposing them to assertions. He emphasizes 
how narratives cannot be translated into assertions rather than showing how narratives are woven 
into assertions and can challenge them: “Everybody would probably grant my first assertion 
above, that narrative constitutes a way of offering insight into causes, characters, values, 
alternative ways of being and the like. But many would baulk at the second affirmation that this 
form is unsubstitutable.”41  
In addition, Taylor blocks out the power of imaginaries to shape the concepts, with which 
they are imbricated. When speaking of the interaction of concepts and imaginaries, he speaks of 




When a theory penetrates and transforms the social imaginary…, people take up, or are 
inducted into new practices. These are made sense of by the new outlook, the one first 
articulated in theory…but this process isn’t just one sided; a theory making over a social 
imaginary. The theory in coming to make sense of the action is glossed, as it were, given 
a particular shape as the context of these practices. Rather like Kant’s notion of an 
abstract category becoming ‘schematized’ when it is applied to reality in space and time, 
the theory is schematized in the dense sphere of common practice.42 
This misstates relationship of concepts to imaginaries. The languages of the social 
imaginaries do not schematize concepts, for schematization ignores the dynamics of languages 
and dialogue in which imaginaries help produce concepts, reducing them to a derivative 
philosophical operation.  Rethinking normativity involves thematizing and revising a package of 
concepts and imaginaries. Such a conception of the social is lost in the notion of schematization, 
which carries unfortunate Kantian baggage that renders imaginaries secondary. Imaginaries are 
not separate from the conceptual argument and should not be relegated to the secondary status, as 
my examples will show. 
For all the richness of his two most recent books, The Language Animal and Retrieving 
Realism, Taylor never moves to integrate his views on language with social imaginaries. In fact, 
the idea of social imaginaries never appears in these works.43 These works are complex and 
interesting—I can hardly summarize them here—but they say nothing to contradict the critique I 
have advanced. In my view, social imaginaries inform our most basic practical engagements with 
the world and their relationship to particular utterances can be made visible and provide a space 
for a new conception of disclosure and practical reasoning. 
Reasoning through the Social Imaginary in Glaspell’s “A Jury of Her Peers” 
13 
 
Susan Glaspell’s short story “A Jury of Her Peers” (1917) offers a phenomenology of 
interpretation in a straightforward everyday language that opens the boundaries of art and 
everyday speech and shows how narratives can make normative arguments. The story dramatizes 
a “world historical” shift in the normative imaginary of gender, a shift that goes far beyond the 
formal political inclusion of women through the extension of the principle of equality, which was 
achieved three years after the story was published through the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920. 
The title of the story alludes to the debates that preceded its passage.  
The tale begins when Mrs. Hale is called from her work in the kitchen to join her 
husband, Mr. Peters (the sheriff), and his wife. Mrs. Hale, the center of focalization for the third-
person narrative, learns that Mr. Wright, the husband of an old friend, has been killed. The 
sheriff suspects that Mrs. Hale’s friend Minnie has killed her husband. The group proceeds to the 
Wrights’ home, where it splits up. The men go out to the barn to look for evidence that can 
establish a motive for Minnie, while the women wait in the kitchen. While sitting there, they 
encounter the “text” of Minnie’s life—the dirty towels, the mishandled stitching on her quilt, the 
act of violence of which she is suspected, and so on. That is, the dominant tradition that the 
women bring to Minnie’s house, a tradition that they share with their husbands, forms 
preunderstandings that do not help them reconstitute the self-understanding of the text. The men 
have called Minnie “mad,” and the women at this point can articulate no other reading, even 
though they sense that more is at stake here for them.  
Slowly the women start to put together an explanation of the strangeness of Minnie’s 
text—the systematic psychological torture to which her husband subjected her, a torture that 
culminated in the strangulation of Minnie’s double, her pet bird. The process of coming to this 
explanation forces them to transform the understandings of their own lives and indeed the 
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gendered imaginaries of the time. Minnie’s text asks them disturbing questions, not just the other 
way around.  
They discover that Minnie’s husband was not just “a cruel man” but also a typical one 
and that Minnie’s response differs only in degree, not in kind, from the ones they have had but 
ignored or repressed. It is important that Mr. Wright commits no actionable offense. He merely 
brings into relief the norms that are already there, norms that inform the actions within many 
marriages. The story’s off-stage narrator shows their complex interaction with the text—
sometimes it grabs them and sometimes they push it away—that is rarely made explicit in their 
consciousness or in dialogue. The women are not exchanging claims in discursive dialogue in 
which they use the constructed political concepts to unmask ideology. They are experiencing a 
challenging rupture—and Glaspell is displaying it—in the reigning package of concepts and 
imaginaries surrounding marriage and gender. The context of their reading—their moments of 
isolation interrupted by their husbands’ condescending remarks about the triviality of women’s 
occupations—helps foster their transformative reading. The women come to understand that the 
values and textures of their own lives are neither read nor recognized by their husbands and that 
the forces that drove Minnie mad operate around and within them as well. The women discover 
the narrow social space in which they have been channeled to live and the anger that they have 
been socialized to ignore.  
The boundaries of their selves have been unraveled as Minnie’s text not only speaks to 
them but for them: “It was as if something within her not herself had spoken, and it found in 
Mrs. Peters something that she did not know as herself.”44 Interpretation in this story is 
dramatized as an event, not an act. When Mrs. Peters discovers the strangled bird, she does not 
just solve a detective’s riddle; she reworks the fabric of her memory and identity. As she recalls 
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and revises the story of what a boy with a hatchet had done to her cat many years ago, she gets 
back the rage of the past moment: “‘If they hadn’t held me back, I would have….’” Minnie’s text 
forces them to see themselves and their husbands in a way that requires a new language that 
gives distinctiveness and worth to their lives and that goes unread by the dominant culture. The 
women do not empathize with Minnie, for empathy implies a subject to subject model of reading 
that ignores the normative work of the story. The text develops a descriptive/normative language 
that did not yet exist so that we do not have normative principles on one side and the facts on the 
other. New normative languages make new facts and meanings available.45  
Unlike Minnie, they are able to create a way of speaking that unites them with each other 
and separates them from the men. They have formed a powerful normative language that gives 
them reasons to do something they never could have imagined before they arrived at the 
Wrights’ house. They have created a “new space of reasons,” to use Sellars’s famous phrase.46 
The story implicitly takes a stance with regard to existing imaginaries and in doing so creates its 
own space in which existing norms are engaged and modified.  
Their interpretations open a new, hitherto unthinkable space of action: they choose to 
hide the bird (conceal evidence), betray their husbands, and break the law. There is nothing 
ineffable about this disclosure, but the reasons of the argument do not appear in terms of the 
principles of public reason, such as justice and equality. Certainly, such notions inform the 
background, but these conceptual principles are woven into the textures of their shared 
imaginaries. Indeed, concepts and imaginaries worked together to form an imprisoning  
discursive package that Minnie’s text calls into question and pushes them to revise.  The third-
person narrator articulates the new space of understanding that emerges for them without ever 
reducing it to a conceptual label.  
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Thus, in answer to Brandom’s charge that world disclosure does not offer reasons, I 
would say that this story is Susan Glaspell’s disclosive, argumentative reasoning. It offers a 
complex account of the discovery of violence embedded in one configuration of norms and 
meanings, of one configuration of reasoning giving. How does one go from not seeing 
domination to seeing it? Not through the application of a constructed principle, but by attending 
to the normative articulations made by Minnie’s text, articulations that open up new ways of 
being in the world. The women are not “finally” understanding what the constructed principle of 
“equality” or “justice” means. They reason by tacking between accounts of their ontological 
background and the interpretive normative intervention that they make. In displaying the 
women’s transformation in a story, Glaspell shows us how normative argument always depends 
on contestable assumptions in the background imaginaries and how we can thematize these 
assumptions and show their normative, argumentative relevance through narrative.  This text also 
illustrates what is left out by thinking of the inclusion of women as the application of a principle 
that lets them vote and serve on juries, while not addressing the social imaginaries that shape 
their lives and society as a whole.  The understanding of narrative in my analysis is quite 
different from Taylor’s and from Paul Ricoeur’s, which Taylor frequently cites. Since Ricoeur’s 
view is widely accepted—and misleading—I will make a short critique of his view that builds on 
my analysis of the story.  
The Narrative Utterance and Argument: Ricoeur’s Mistake 
In Time and Narrative, Ricoeur divides mimesis into three moments. Mimesis 1 (M1) 
addresses the pre-understandings of “the world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic 
resources, and its temporal character.”47 Mimesis 2 examines the emplotment, which mediates 
preunderstandings and readings (M2), while Mimesis 3, the reading, addresses “the intersection 
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of the world of the text and the world of the hearer or reader.”48 The reader’s response to the text, 
M3, folds back into M1 as part of the new preunderstandings in the lifeworld, thus completing 
the hermeneutic circle. 
In Mimesis 1, Ricoeur drives a wedge between narrative and experience in the world at 
the same time that he freezes the historical and dialogical character of language and literature. 
Ricoeur does not place the subject in language and narratives so that inchoate narratives already 
inform experience. To be sure, Ricoeur acknowledges that history and fiction “are preceded by 
the use of narrative in daily life.”49 However, “prefiguration” is a cognitive capacity that stands 
against the experience of time, which in itself is “confused, unformed, and, at the limit, mute.”50 
For Ricoeur, we are not thrown into the narratives of the social imaginary. Thus, Mimesis 1 is “a 
structure of human praxis prior to the work of configuration by the historical or the fictional 
narrative.”51 This structure is informed by past narratives, past configurations.  
Mimesis 2, or emplotment, is not an interpretive act through which the subject intervenes 
in the social imaginaries. Ricoeur develops his conception of the novel as emplotment without 
reference to imaginaries, the languages of public life or an ontological conception of meaning; 
instead, he draws on Aristotle’s Poetics and on Kant’s reflective judgment. Ricoeur isolates and 
reduces the configurational act to an ordering by the individual imagination: “I cannot 
overemphasize the kinship between this ‘grasping together’ power to the configurational act and 
what Kant says about the operation of judging.”52 Emplotment “extracts configuration from a 
succession” in the same that way that a reflective judgment “reflects upon the work of thinking at 
work in the aesthetic judgment of taste and the teleological judgment applied to organic 
wholes.”53 In a stroke, Ricoeur has reduced the author’s engagement with worth and truth of the 
languages of social imaginaries to a formal aestheticism.54 Thus, when he says that emplotment 
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is the “synthesis of the heterogeneous”—that is, “the diverse mediations performed by the plot: 
between the manifold of events and the temporal unity of the story recounted between the 
disparate components of the action” 55—the substantive epistemological, normative, and 
ontological issues that narratives engage become a merely reflexive ordering. By looking at 
narrative as the emplotment of the heterogeneous, Ricoeur blocks out the way in which 
emplotment is always a normative re-engagement with the narrative and symbolic shapes the 
subject inevitably already inhabits. Ricoeur keeps novelists out of the argument business, limiting 
them only to emplotment. “Historians are not simply narrators: they give reasons…. Poets also 
create plots that are held together by causal skeletons. But these … are not the subject of a 
process of argumentation. Poets restrict themselves to producing the story and explaining by 
narrating […]. [Poets] produce, [historians] argue.”56 Glaspell is not the only counter example to 
this claim. Proust—one of the novelists he discusses at length in Time and Narrative—makes 
extensive arguments against his realist predecessors both by explicit proposition and by narrative 
practice.  
 Since he conceives of narrative as the act of an isolated imagination, it is not surprising 
that Ricoeur’s discussion of the novel in Time and Narrative and Oneself as Another is 
remarkably ahistorical. Despite the fact that the rise of the novel is embedded in issues of 
modernity itself, such as individualism, liberty, and language, Ricoeur ignores them all in his 
discussions of literature. For Ricoeur, novels are just examples of how the aporias of cosmic and 
experienced time are mediated by plot, or they are “thought experiments” in the Husserlian mold 
of imaginative variation in which our thrownness is ignored: “Literature proves to consist in a 
vast laboratory for thought experiments in which the sources of variation encompassed by 
narrative identity are put to the test of narration.” 57 We are now ready for a very different 
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example of how arguing through the social imaginary works, one that does not narrate the 
transition from one normative framework to another; instead, we see an aggressive confrontation 
of a dominant imaginative framework by alternative.  
Obama and the Discursive Constraints of Racial Politics 
I will begin with Barack Obama’s famous “race speech,” “A More Perfect Union,” and 
show the ways that it is tied to the discursive form of normativity laid down by Brown v. Board. 
I then examine how the work of Ta-Nehisi Coates exposes the ways this discursive form protects 
the majority from addressing the normative demands of African Americans. 
When Obama himself addressed questions of race in his speeches, his language and 
reasoning were tied to the normative model of constitutional principles applied to particular 
situations, and this model harbors within it the tradition of silence on race that began with the 
gag orders prior to the Civil War. The model was given its modern discursive form in Brown v. 
Board of Education.58 In this argument for the American conception of equality, an admirable 
principle was bound with certain discursive constraints that occlude the world that Ta-Nehesi 
Coates, and his predecessors, such as Ralph Ellison, tried to expose. During the Brown 
deliberations, Chief Justice Earl Warren gave explicit recommendations to the other justices on 
the language of the decision: It “should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, 
unemotional and, above all, nonaccusatory.”59  
The Brown decision was not only shaped by the silence about the perpetrators of racist 
acts, but by three other features of the discursive landscape. One was the way social scientific 
evidence was gathered and used. Brown’s famous footnote 11 to Kenneth Clark’s research, 
showing that adolescent black girls preferred white dolls to black ones, and to Gunnar Myrdal’s 
American Dilemma.  Both were used to establish the “damage hypothesis” and the language of 
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victimhood as the appropriate lenses for addressing race. While these languages may have been 
effective in breaking down legal segregation, they were also effective in reinforcing 
condescension and inequality. The white majority could treat blacks as an object of pity, an 
approach that did little to challenge their own self-understanding. The American imagination 
could not conceive of injustice without victims, and whites did not recognize that they, not just 
African Americans, were damaged by racism. This disempowering condescension can be seen in 
the structure of many “progressive” literary works, such as To Kill a Mockingbird, in which we 
see black characters only from the point of view of whites, only as the objects of pity. The fact 
that this work served as a racial epiphany for many whites reveals how “recognizing” the evils of 
segregation can, at the same time, reinforce domination and misrecognition.60 
 In addition, Myrdal’s work established a pattern of disregarding African American 
voices and seeing their culture as a pathological product of the slavery system. He claimed that 
African American culture “is a distorted development, or a pathological condition, of the general 
American culture.” From this he concluded that it is to the advantage of African Americans as 
individuals and as a group to become assimilated into American culture.61 Myrdal’s text 
encouraged white leaders to ignore the voices of African Americans and to urge blacks to 
abandon their culture and adapt to the dominant culture. 
The third feature of the hegemonic American imagination was interest convergence—that 
is, blacks gained social justice primarily when their interests converged with the interests of the 
white majority.62 At the time of Brown, as is well-known, the United States’ racial practices were 
a source of embarrassment in the Cold War because they undermined America’s image abroad.63 
These forces joined the first two elements mentioned to push the court and other elites to support 
desegregation without recognizing African American’s autonomy or their voices. Interest 
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convergence was not just a sociological phenomenon of domination; it became part of a 
discursive form that systematically silenced other forms of writing and living.  
These three dimensions of American society hardened into a gag rule that continues 
today not only for the court but for mainstream media, though not for African American media, 
the black public sphere, and the black church. The mainstream media ignore these languages, for 
the most part, until such languages touch a person who is trying to succeed in the mainstream, 
such as a presidential candidate.  
  The exclusion of black voices from the mainstream media did not mean that African 
Americans did not speak out. From the time of the Civil War, the black public sphere has split in 
many ways from the mainstream public sphere.64 Black writers have taken up the political 
responsibility of writing in ways that challenge the dominant narratives of American public life. 
The first writer to respond directly to Myrdal’s book was Ralph Ellison, and he directed his 
attack at Myrdal’s reading of black culture: “Myrdal sees Negro culture and personality simply 
as the product of a ‘social pathology.’” While acknowledging that “Negro” culture has some 
undesirable features, Ellison insists in “An America Dilemma: A Review” that “there is much of 
great value and richness, which because it has been secreted by living and has made their lives 
more meaningful, Negroes will not willingly disregard.”65 Myrdal’s misreadings lead him to 
assume that, in Ellison’s words, “it is to the advantage of American Negroes as a group to 
become assimilated into American culture, to acquire the traits held in esteem by the dominant 
white Americans.” 66 For Ellison, neither white nor black culture can be affirmed in an 
unqualified way, for they are both damaged and imbricated in ways that go unnoticed: “What is 
needed in our country is not an exchange of pathologies but a change in the basis of society. This 
is a job which both Negroes and whites must perform together. In Negro culture there is much of 
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value for America as a whole.”67 Hence, American society needs neither mere integration of 
bodies into the same public spaces nor gathering statistics about inequality but a transformation 
of the social imaginary into which whites and blacks are integrated. Not surprisingly, Ellison saw 
the novel not as an “ordering of the heterogeneous,” as Ricoeur would have it, or the disclosure 
of what cannot be said through conceptual assertions, in Taylor’s view, but as an argument: “All 
novels of a given historical moment form an argument over the nature of reality and are, to an 
extent, criticisms of each other.” 68 Moreover, Ellison understood that revising the social 
imaginary (though he never used such a term) is a multidisciplinary affair. He not only took on 
Myrdal’s sociological analysis of race, but also Howard Zinn’s historical work, and Richard 
Wright’s literary theory and practice.69 
Thematizing the social imaginary as part of the deliberative process requires a new model 
for political deliberation, a model that calls the self-understanding behind Brown into question 
and brings new features of the world out of the background. This alternative way of 
understanding normativity is implicit in the works of Ellison, Wright, James Baldwin, Toni 
Morrison, and Ta-Nehisi Coates when we read them through this ontological perspective. These 
writers are not advocating a “politics of identity” or recognition but challenging the borders of 
America’s normative imagination—precisely what Obama was compelled to avoid.  
Obama’s “race speech” in 2008 veers away from writings that challenge America’s 
collective self-understandings and resorts to an updated version of the Brown model. The speech 
came after the media criticized the sermons given by Obama’s minister, Reverend Jeremiah 
Wright, in which Wright expressed rage at America’s failures. Wright’s sermon was in the form 
of a “jeremiad,” which has a long history in American and African American culture. From the 
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Puritans to Frederick Douglas to Martin Luther King, this form has been used to criticize the 
promise and failures of America. 
Reverend Wright’s sermons were not part of a marginal, radical fringe. They were very 
well-known in the African American community and were even used as models for black 
divinity school.70 The criticism of Wright by the media displayed not only ignorance of the genre 
but, more importantly, a willful ignorance of African American speech and writing, whose 
normative claims challenged the dominant white identities and the historical understandings that 
underpin them. Obama alludes to the fissure between the discursive universes of blacks and 
whites in his speech: “The fact that so many people are surprised to hear that anger in some of 
Reverend Wright’s sermons simply reminds us of the old truism that the most segregated hour in 
American life occurs on Sunday morning.”71 The oblivion of whites to Reverend Wright’s form 
of speech is symptomatic of widespread oblivion about the reality of black lives. “Black lives 
matter” not only when they are being profiled and tased—the focus of attention in the news 
media—but also when black people are speaking, acting, and laughing.72 When people respond 
to the cry of “black lives matter” with “all lives matter,” they are simply repeating the legacy of 
Brown by offering an abstract normative principle while refusing to acknowledge the forceful 
normative structuring of American life.  
Since black people appear in the collective imagination as a group that must be 
contained, pitied, and “helped” but never listened to, it is no wonder that Darren Wilson, the 
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri who shot the unarmed Michael Brown, told the jury that he 
shot Brown because he looked “like a demon,” a force pushing back against the system.73 When 
mainstream media finally paid attention, their only question was to ask how anyone running for 
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president could listen to such words regularly rather than asking how responsible media could 
ignore so many voices that challenged their self-understanding and conception of the world.  
In his speech following the release of Wright’s sermons, Obama does give voice to the 
anger and disappointment of blacks, but he is careful to balance it with the feelings of unhappy 
whites. Moreover, Obama recasts the long and brutal history of systemic and institutionalized 
racism as mere moral lapses.74 He must affirm his patriotism and distance himself from language 
such as Wright’s by placing this language and its rage at a historical distance from the present: 
“For the men and women of Reverend Wright’s generation, the memories of humiliation and 
doubt and fear have not gone away; nor has the anger and the bitterness of those years. That 
anger may not get expressed in public, in front of white coworkers and white friends. But it does 
find voice in the barbershop or the beauty shop or around the kitchen tables … and occasionally 
it finds voice in church on Sunday.”75  
In order to support the notion of generational differences, as opposed to racial 
differences, Obama draws a parallel with his own white grandmother’s occasional racist remarks. 
Wright’s comments, like the racism on the white side of Obama’s own family, are like the racism 
of a family member of a previous generation, a problem we all have. We can criticize them, but 
we cannot “disown” them.76 Moreover, he voices the anger of whites who do not feel that they 
have been privileged in a way that justifies affirmative action and other preferential treatments of 
African Americans.77 Anger on both sides has proved “counterproductive” because the 
realization of all Americans’ dreams is not a zero-sum game, in which realizing one dream 
comes at the expense of another.78 He acknowledges that “disparities that exist between the 
African American community and the larger American community” and that “the inequalities 
passed on from an earlier generation suffered under the brutal legacy of slavery and Jim Crow.”79 
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However, when it comes to blame, he is careful to balance his criticism of whites with criticisms 
of blacks.80 
Thus, when Obama notes that the Constitution “was ultimately unfinished. It was stained 
by this nation’s original sin of slavery,” he quickly adds that “the answer to the slavery question 
was already embedded within our Constitution—a Constitution that had at its very core the ideal 
of equal citizenship under the law.”81 From his beginning with “we the people” to his anecdote 
of racial unity, Obama affirms what Jack Balkin calls the grand progressive narrative that 
dominates America’s self-understanding: “America is continually striving for democratic ideals 
from its founding and eventually realizing democracy through its historical development. In this 
narrative, the constitution reflects America’s deepest ideals, which are gradually realized through 
historical struggle and acts of political courage. The basic ideals of America and American 
people are good, even if Americans sometimes act unjustly.”82 In Obama’s reading, 
constitutional principle can serve as the basis for an overlapping consensus among major 
religions. Obama says: “In the end, then what is called for is nothing more and nothing less than 
what all the world’s great religions demand—that we do unto others as we would have them do 
unto us. Let us be our brother’s keeper, scripture tells.”83 This ethical principle can be activated 
to address problems of race and difference through the idea of “empathy,” through which 
universal principle addresses the particulars of individual lives. 
Empathy follows from the constructivist understanding of equality because it depends on 
the capacity of the individual subject to project himself/herself into another’s life. Defining it 
succinctly as a successful attempt to “stand in somebody else’s shoes and see through their 
eyes,” Obama regards empathy not as an exceptional gesture but an organizing principle for 
ethical behavior and even a preferred way of being.84 By cultivating our capacity for empathy, he 
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says, we are forced beyond “our limited vision,” making it possible to overcome what divides us, 
allowing us to “find common ground” even in the face of our sharpest disagreements. Obama 
makes empathy “the heart of my moral code” and “a guidepost for my politics” in The Audacity 
of Hope and in “A More Perfect Union.”85 He ends his speech with the story of Ashley, in which 
a black man draws inspiration from a young white woman. The model of empathy fits well with 
thinking of normativity as the application of constitutional principles since it is organized around 
equal respect and concern for individuals. But this way of understanding normativity has failed 
to come to grips with the transsubjective normative structuring of the world. We need to come to 
grips with this understanding of normativity if we are to bring into view the racial structuring of 
society. 
Coates’s Challenge to America’s Dominant Racial Imaginary 
Ta-Nehisi Coates’s book has been looked on as a direct reply to Obama’s discussions of 
race.86 Coates makes this challenge not by a competing argument organized around principles of 
justice or equality. Instead, he reveals the normative languages that imprison African American 
lives, languages that include narratives, images, and characters. Against America’s “progressive 
narrative” that Balkin identifies, Coates tells his son: “The entire narrative of this country argues 
against the truth of who you are.”87 To Coates, these structures are the tissues of rationalization 
that encase the subjectivity of a privileged group that Coates calls “the Dreamers,” alluding to 
the subtitle of The Audacity of Hope: Reclaiming the American Dream, as well as other versions 
of this dream. The dreamers are a self-contained community that does not think of itself as a 
community, but whose inhabitants live in a distinctive normative universe. Because their 
privilege, empowerment, and normative insularity are invisible to them, this universe is the site 
for pronouncements about “justice” and “equality” for society as a whole. 
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To capture the self-understanding of the Dreamers, Coates cites Solzhenitsyn’s well-
known remark that “to do evil a human being must first of all believe that what he’s doing is 
good, or else that it’s a well-considered act in conformity with natural law.” Coates then 
comments: “This is the foundation of the Dream—its adherents must not just believe in it but 
believe that it is just, believe that their possession of the dream is the natural result of grit, honor, 
and good works. There is a passing acknowledgment of the bad old days, which, by the way, 
were not so bad as to have any ongoing effect on our present. The mettle that it takes to look 
away from the horror of our prison system, from police forces transformed into armies, from the 
long war against the black body, is not forged overnight. This is the practiced habit.”88 
Constitutional principles cannot root out inequality for it is woven into the language of 
the Dreamers’ world. No thought experiment can lift a Dreamer out of this world or bring an 
outsider in. A Dreamer cannot empathize with the kind of life Coates is describing because the 
Dreamer needs a new framework for understanding normativity so that the “facts” of a 
nondreamer’s life can appear. Coates is not appealing to a politics of identity but thematizing the 
ontological force of the reigning normative order.89  
Thus, when he speaks of the police violence and of talk about sensitivity training, he is 
dismissive because such localization of the problem misses the point. It is not the police who 
commit the crimes but the American people locked in the dreamer imaginary: “The truth is that 
the police reflect America in all of its will and fear, and whatever we might make of this 
country’s criminal justice policy, it cannot be said that it was imposed by a repressive minority. 
The abuses that have followed from these policies—the sprawling carceral state, the random 
detentions of black people, the torture of suspects—are the product of democratic will.”90 
Coates’s language is at once descriptive and normative. He wants to make clear that the 
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dominant collective imagination of most whites and many blacks provides a framework in which 
criminality is understood, a framework that is not shared by minorities. He calls this framework 
the product of “will” in order to insist on the collective intentionality at work here.91  
Coates’s argument here works in a very different way than we find in much legal and 
political theory on race, which, for my purposes here, can be conveniently divided into 
antidiscrimination and antidomination approaches. The antidiscrimination argument maintains 
that the law should be colorblind.92 The antisubordination thesis, on the other hand, argues that 
there are large patterns of racial subordination made available through sociological analysis, 
patterns that the antidiscrimination thesis systematically occludes by focusing on the intentions 
behind laws. Between the World and Me, by contrast, takes aim at the normative weight and 
shape of America’s collective imagination that drives research in both of these popular 
conceptions but which is thematized by neither one. This is not to say that Coates’s position is 
beyond challenge by any means. Rather, my point is that he provides a kind of normative 
argument that is unavailable by other approaches to normativity.  
 Coates’s text is one in a long line of African American writings that have sought to 
shake readers loose from their frameworks. However, people do not give up frameworks easily, 
particularly frameworks of long standing such as the one which makes its reappearance yet again 
beneath the eloquence of Obama’s speech, a reappearance that displays the contemporary form 
of America’s continuing gag-order about race. 
Conclusion 
The ontological turn in political philosophy has offered important new approaches to the 
deep structures of past, present, and future societies. However, this line of thought has not 
produced a viable theory of the normative utterance that follows from this approach, leaving 
itself open to criticism for abstracting from the agency of particular actors and for adopting the 
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ambiguous language of world disclosure.93 In this essay, I have proposed a way of thinking about 
the relationship of background structures to particular utterances that expands the ways we think 
about normativity and argument. Rather than splitting off normative claims from sociological 
and narrative approaches to political philosophy, I propose to look at normativity from the 
perspective of social imaginaries, the ontological background structures of a given society. In this 
view, normativity is inflected by the particular shapes of forms of life but those shapes are never 
simply social facts; rather, they are the contestable background of speech and action into which 
we are thrown. Prior to questions of principle or fact are the ontological questions that emerge 
from social imaginaries and through which we orient ourselves in the world. We cannot point to 
the normativity of social imaginaries through the lens of constructivist theory or through the 
language of political realism for the context in question is not empirical nor ideal.  
This ontological conception responds to the dilemmas that emerge in arguments between 
constructivists and realists. Realists complain that constructivist conceptions of normativity are 
detached from reality, while constructivists complain that realists and contextualists do not give 
an adequate place to normativity.94 The ontological conception makes normativity historical and 
contextual but the context starts with the macro structures that make the world and normativity 
itself possible. In the work of Glaspell and Coates, we find not just concrete situations presented 
phenomenologically but also external description that engages the discursive structures that 
display the actors and their dilemmas.  However, the texts do not just direct us to facts we 
already know; instead, they urge us to look at the background structures that make certain facts 
possible and that lock the characters in to their preconceptions— in “Jury,” the women’s 
understandings of gender, marriage, etc. and in Between the World and Me, the conflicting 
worlds of Dreamers and African Americans.  In both texts, we saw how the understanding of 
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normativity for a community at any given moment must understood not just as the slow 
emergence of macro structures imaginaries that we find in Taylor’s analysis—public sphere, 
popular sovereignty, etc.,-- which is done from great historical height with attention to longue 
durée, for this view implies that imaginaries are simply the nourishing background for principles 
or the shared background that makes debate possible. Instead, we need to attend to the language 
the texts use to bring our attention to the ways imaginaries feed ontological divisions within a 
political community, divisions that are covered over by the received understandings of both the 
real world and how it should be evaluated. As the texts make these structures surface through the 
phenomenological presentation of the characters, the reader is encouraged to connect them not 
by pointing to particular individuals—“I know someone just like that”—but to patterns, just as 
Mrs. Peters finds in Minnie’s text not only a parallel with her own life but an articulation of 
violence toward women that has been systematically silenced by the structures of the imaginary.  
These structures are both realistic and normative since they make possible what world is 
available and the assessment of this world. 95 Normative argument relies on bringing aspects of 
the world into view, not only on the application of principles.  
In a similar way, Coates’s Between the World and Me attacks the dominant American 
framework for understanding race for its failure to grasp the structures of black life, structures 
that are brought out through a phenomenological narrative. Coates’s argument reveals insulating 
moral narratives—including constitutional ones--that protect the majority from facing the cruelty 
that is reproduced daily. Coates shows that the failure to understand is at once epistemic and 
normative, a house of privilege that is invisible to the inhabitants at the same time that it makes 
those outside invisible. Coates is being “realistic,” but he is not presenting sociological facts and 
then arguing for why these facts indicate injustice. Rather, he is striking at the ontology that 
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generates facts and norms and therefore opening a space for new historical and sociological 
questions that can follow up on his insights. Coates’s text makes clear that the people holding on 
to identity politics are not African Americans asking for recognition; rather, the people playing 
identity politics are the Dreamers whose identity defines the boundaries and blindnesses of their 
world.  Coates show how principles enable Dreamers to assume that they have access to all the 
normatively relevant aspects of the world and to rationalize their contented inaction. Persuading 
the Dreamers means getting them to change the imaginaries that sustain their identities.  The 
depth of resistance to Coates’s argument can be seen not just in his critics but in the effusive 
praise for a speech that conforms to America’s template for deliberation about race, Obama’s “A 
More Perfect Union.”  
My argument for a new understanding of the normative utterance and social imaginaries 
is not just a matter of isolated examples. By showing the link between normativity and realism, 
my understanding of the problematic of the social imaginary provides a way to bring together 
and mediate the languages of history, literature, and sociology so that they can work together in 
normative argument.96 I have focused here on the ways that a short story, a Supreme Court 
decision, a speech, and a letter can illuminate the ways the social imaginaries install meanings 
and norms and at the same time provide resources for their revision.97 However, arguments 
through the imaginary can also be done at the level of macro background history, such as we see 
in the competing accounts of secularity in the work of Taylor, Gauchet, Michael Allen Gillespie, 
and Mark Lilla.98 These arguments seek to change the background history, which, in turn, will 
affect many local debates. The problematic of the social imaginary enables us to understand that 
the normative utterance cannot be hived off from the worldhood of the world and that 
normativity is woven into the imaginary. The normative utterance is first and foremost an 
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engagement with the languages and practices of the social imaginary, for the background is 
logically prior to normative propositions and sociological explanations. This means that 
normative argument must concern itself with the articulation this background and the discursive 
structures through which it is instantiated and challenged. Such arguments will not be as neat as 
a Supreme Court decision, but they will give us a lot more to argue with and about than in 
thought experiments to produce principles. Although I have developed these two examples to 
show some of the possibilities opened by the problematic of social imaginaries, I am not arguing 
for the abandonment of the language of principle in all situations; rather, this essay asks for the 
inclusion of new kinds of normative arguments that can hear and articulate the world’s 
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